HOW FAR IS THE U.S. BOUND TO UPHOLD THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF GEORGIA?

14.viii.08

How did the United States get into a situation in which the President of Georgia believed that he could expect American military intervention to save him from the Russians? A history of foolish encouragements no doubt gives some credit to this belief, as it led to the decision by Georgia to attack in South Ossetia. That the United States should encourage Georgia to be a democracy and discourage Russia from undermining the regime there, not to speak of sending tanks and troops deep into the country is one thing. To go further in plans for military help is to blunder beyond the limits of American military power. Has not the United States already gone too far in supporting the national aspirations of Georgia (which are unfortunately a very popular aspect of democratic practices there)? South Ossetia, like Abkhasia, have small populations that respectively speak, not Georgian, but separate languages and are (one supposes) otherwise distinct ethnically from Georgia. Moreover, they do not want – strongly do not want – to belong to Georgia. Why should Georgia demand that they should, except for an irrational attachment to territoriality, a perennial cause of stupid wars? Nowhere in the Western discussion so far of the crisis in Georgia has the suggestion come to light that Georgia minimize its troubles by cutting South Ossetia and Abkhasia loose. It nevertheless seems a well-taken suggestion, as does the suggestion that the United States stop blustering where it cannot effectively project force, and cannot reasonably expect to.