Sunday, June 29, 2008
HOW DISCREDITABLE WAS IT FOR OBAMA TO BREAK PROMISES ON PUBLIC FINANCING?
In spite of popular rigidity about the force of rules and in particular the rule about promising, these rules are subject to exceptions, as rules are generally. St Thomas makes a special virtue about recognizing the exceptions and acting upon them. But it is too easy to award oneself the exceptions. Obama, breaking both his promise to go along with the restrictions associated with public financing and his promise to discuss public financing with McCain, cannot escape some discredit. The commentators, however, treated Obama with undue moral rigidity. Not only did they not recognize that in some circumstances departing from the rule about promising would be acceptable. They did not think beyond the box of credit vs. discredit. On the PBS Newshour, Shields as well as Brooks neglected to consider creditable arguments that Obama might have put forward for breaking his promises. One is that he was justified in taking precautions against what McCain or McCain’s people might do with well-financed 527 operations. To set aside his own mass-support would have been quixotic and a betrayal as well. Another argument was that in raising the money that he did from mass-support with small contributions had in an unexpected way achieved what the public financing arrangements aimed at – less influence by the big moneyed interests. The issue of discredit is thus a very mixed one.
Saturday, June 28, 2008
RETIRING TWO TOPICS
The posts and comments on wasted votes and spoiler candidates have had several weeks’ run and
had some lively attention. "Spoiler candidates," in particular, caught the attention of Sirius Radio and Sirius Radio has proposed that I touch upon it along with some topics of my own in an interview soon to be arranged. I’ll let it run until a week after the interview. Then I’ll set it aside from the postings, along with wasted votes, which I’ll set aside now. Both topics, as I said when I posted them, relate to logic for politics, in the simple and informal sense in which I’m using the term "logic." However, they do not belong to the center of concern that I would like to have the blog concentrate on, namely, successes and failures in the argumentation currently being carried on by politicians and political commentators. I wish to renew that focus; and to do so, I’ll follow up this note with a post on the objections to Obama’s renouncing public financing.
had some lively attention. "Spoiler candidates," in particular, caught the attention of Sirius Radio and Sirius Radio has proposed that I touch upon it along with some topics of my own in an interview soon to be arranged. I’ll let it run until a week after the interview. Then I’ll set it aside from the postings, along with wasted votes, which I’ll set aside now. Both topics, as I said when I posted them, relate to logic for politics, in the simple and informal sense in which I’m using the term "logic." However, they do not belong to the center of concern that I would like to have the blog concentrate on, namely, successes and failures in the argumentation currently being carried on by politicians and political commentators. I wish to renew that focus; and to do so, I’ll follow up this note with a post on the objections to Obama’s renouncing public financing.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
SHOULD OBAMA GO TO IRAQ?
For Obama's going: McCain will lose a talking point. Against Obama’s going: he will be sucked closer to Bush"s and McCain’s view that there has been progress in reducing the violence in Iraq, and withdrawing U. S. troops would forfeit the progress. Closer: he need not just by going adopt the view, but he will be confronting Petraeus’s military judgment without having any military standing of his own. However, he could take with him people with the military standing to disagree with Petraeus: General Zinni comes to mind, as does Senator Webb. They could probe Petraeus’s weak points, which include his attempt to disown knowing about any plan for withdrawal. Not having a plan or ignoring the importance of having a plan is itself a lapse in military thinking. Worse, it undermines the prediction by Petraeus and others that withdrawal will lead to dire consequences. How dire the consequences will be depends on the care and precautions taken in the best plan for withdrawal. Testifying before Congress Petraeus was allowed to evade this point. Obama could combine with Zinni and Webb to pin him down on it. Then, with Obama in the lead, they could adopt Clemenceau’s maxim that war is too serious a matter to leave to the generals and raise the level of discussion. They could ask whether it is still the business of the U. S. to mitigate civil war in Iraq. If it is not, progress or no progress, our troops should not be there; and the progress, maybe a temporary lull, is just a bonus making it easier to bring them away.
Saturday, June 14, 2008
THE "SPOILER" FALLACIES (REVISED)
When Ralph Nader announced he was entering the 2008 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton repeated the charge that he had "spoiled" the 2000 election for Al Gore and was responsible for Bush’s coming into office. When Bob Barr gained the nomination of the Libertarian Party last month, many pundits asked whether he might become a "spoiler" for John McCain. What is a spoiler supposed to be and by what reasoning are they identified?
In the case of Ralph Nader, the reasoning behind Clinton’s charge has the appearance of scapegoating. It is true that if all of those who voted for Nader had instead voted for Gore—and holding fixed all other votes as they were cast and recorded—Gore would have had more votes than Bush. However, looking at the vote totals for Florida in 2000, it is also true that if all of those who voted for Browne (or Buchanan or Phillips or Hagelin) had voted for Gore, then Gore would have had more votes than Bush. It might be that, on average, Nader voters were more likely to prefer Gore as a second option than were those who voted for the other minor party and independent candidates. However, the fact that any of these other groups of voters could also have swung the vote to Gore points to the real problem with spoiler arguments/accusations.
In most elections there are multiple candidates all competing with each other for as many votes as they can get. (But it is not just that there are a set number of voters who will vote and for whose votes the candidates are competing; the candidates are also all trying to "get out the vote.") And since the system is winner-take-all, every candidate covets the potential voters of every other candidate. In such a situation, every candidate wants to win (or so I am assuming here) and thus wants to spoil the election for every other candidate. Given this state of affairs, it would seem George W. Bush deserves Clinton’s ire as a "spoiler"—far more than Ralph Nader—since Bush took far more votes from Al Gore. Indeed, he took far more votes cast by registered Democrats!
Here is the vote count from Florida in 2000:
Bush 2,909,176
Gore 2,907,451
Nader 96,837
Browne 18,856
Buchanan 17,356
Phillips 4,280
Hagelin 2287
In this year’s election why shouldn’t Bob Barr or Ralph Nader claim that John McCain and Barack Obama are spoilers? If there is some asymmetry such that the "spoiler" label sticks only to underdogs and not to those who are favored in the polls, what principled account can be given of this asymmetry? The two major parties might want to perpetuate the assumption that a voter’s task is to choose between the two major party candidates. But this seems to me to be a false dichotomy.
In the case of Ralph Nader, the reasoning behind Clinton’s charge has the appearance of scapegoating. It is true that if all of those who voted for Nader had instead voted for Gore—and holding fixed all other votes as they were cast and recorded—Gore would have had more votes than Bush. However, looking at the vote totals for Florida in 2000, it is also true that if all of those who voted for Browne (or Buchanan or Phillips or Hagelin) had voted for Gore, then Gore would have had more votes than Bush. It might be that, on average, Nader voters were more likely to prefer Gore as a second option than were those who voted for the other minor party and independent candidates. However, the fact that any of these other groups of voters could also have swung the vote to Gore points to the real problem with spoiler arguments/accusations.
In most elections there are multiple candidates all competing with each other for as many votes as they can get. (But it is not just that there are a set number of voters who will vote and for whose votes the candidates are competing; the candidates are also all trying to "get out the vote.") And since the system is winner-take-all, every candidate covets the potential voters of every other candidate. In such a situation, every candidate wants to win (or so I am assuming here) and thus wants to spoil the election for every other candidate. Given this state of affairs, it would seem George W. Bush deserves Clinton’s ire as a "spoiler"—far more than Ralph Nader—since Bush took far more votes from Al Gore. Indeed, he took far more votes cast by registered Democrats!
Here is the vote count from Florida in 2000:
Bush 2,909,176
Gore 2,907,451
Nader 96,837
Browne 18,856
Buchanan 17,356
Phillips 4,280
Hagelin 2287
In this year’s election why shouldn’t Bob Barr or Ralph Nader claim that John McCain and Barack Obama are spoilers? If there is some asymmetry such that the "spoiler" label sticks only to underdogs and not to those who are favored in the polls, what principled account can be given of this asymmetry? The two major parties might want to perpetuate the assumption that a voter’s task is to choose between the two major party candidates. But this seems to me to be a false dichotomy.
UNEXAMINED STEREOTYPES
14 June 08
Doubtless on both sides of the presidential campaign stereotypes persist. Most salient at the moment appear to be the characterizations of McCain as a war hero qualified therefore to make strategic judgments and as a maverick whose independent mind leads him to depart time and again from party orthodoxy. People – including the opposing candidates, when there were more than one – don’t question the military authority that he claims even when they differ with him sharply on the judgment of continuing the war in Iraq. But with that judgment, he falls – ironically, without their experience in making strategic judgments – into the same class as generals on the Western Front in the First World War who, with experience from which they learned little or nothing, went on sending men to futile slaughter by the tens of thousands. McCain’s characterization as a maverick is equally uncompelling in implication. He was, a few years ago, a maverick on a number of issues, but now he is consistently an orthodox Republican on the war, on tax cuts for the rich, on reproductive rights for women. Mark Shields, on the PBS Newshour Friday evening 13 June, declared that McCain is a maverick and Shields said that he acknowledged as much. He then went on, ironically, to point out that McCain’s position on taxes was the orthodox Republican position. Shields and his partner David Brooks went on to converge on predicting a campaign opposing orthodox Republican positions to orthodox Democratic ones.
Doubtless on both sides of the presidential campaign stereotypes persist. Most salient at the moment appear to be the characterizations of McCain as a war hero qualified therefore to make strategic judgments and as a maverick whose independent mind leads him to depart time and again from party orthodoxy. People – including the opposing candidates, when there were more than one – don’t question the military authority that he claims even when they differ with him sharply on the judgment of continuing the war in Iraq. But with that judgment, he falls – ironically, without their experience in making strategic judgments – into the same class as generals on the Western Front in the First World War who, with experience from which they learned little or nothing, went on sending men to futile slaughter by the tens of thousands. McCain’s characterization as a maverick is equally uncompelling in implication. He was, a few years ago, a maverick on a number of issues, but now he is consistently an orthodox Republican on the war, on tax cuts for the rich, on reproductive rights for women. Mark Shields, on the PBS Newshour Friday evening 13 June, declared that McCain is a maverick and Shields said that he acknowledged as much. He then went on, ironically, to point out that McCain’s position on taxes was the orthodox Republican position. Shields and his partner David Brooks went on to converge on predicting a campaign opposing orthodox Republican positions to orthodox Democratic ones.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
THE 'SPOILER' FALLACIES
(Contributed by Nathan Westbrook)
When Ralph Nader announced he was entering the 2008 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton repeated the charge that he had "spoiled" the 2000 election for Al Gore and was responsible for Bush’s coming into office. When Bob Barr gained the nomination of the Libertarian Party last month, many pundits asked whether he might become a "spoiler" for John McCain. What is a spoiler supposed to be and by what reasoning are they identified?
In the case of Ralph Nader, the reasoning behind Clinton’s charge has the appearance of scapegoating. It is true that if all of those who voted for Nader had instead voted for Gore—and holding fixed all other votes as they were cast and recorded—Gore would have had more votes than Bush. However, looking at the vote totals for Florida in 2000, it is also true that if all of those who voted for Browne (or Buchanan or Phillips or Hagelin) had voted for Gore, then Gore would have had more votes than Bush. It might be that, on average, Nader voters were more likely to prefer Gore as a second option than were those who voted for the other minor party and independent candidates. However, the fact that any of these other groups of voters could also have swung the vote to Gore points to the real problem with spoiler arguments/accusations.
In most elections there are multiple candidates all competing with each other for as many votes as they can get. (But it is not just that there are a set number of voters who will vote and for whose votes the candidates are competing; the candidates are also all trying to "get out the vote.") And since the system is winner-take-all, every candidate covets the potential voters of every other candidate. In such a situation, every candidate wants to win (or so I am assuming here) and thus wants to spoil the election for every other candidate. Given this state of affairs, it would seem George W. Bush deserves Clinton’s ire as a "spoiler"—far more than Ralph Nader—since Bush took far more votes from Al Gore. Indeed, he took far more votes cast by registered Democrats!
Candidates
Votes
Vote %
Bush
2,909,176
49 %
Gore
2,907,451
49 %
Nader
96,837
2 %
Browne
18,856
0 %
Buchanan
17,356
0 %
Phillips
4,280
0 %
Hagelin
2,287
0 %
In this year’s election why shouldn’t Bob Barr or Ralph Nader claim that John McCain and Barack Obama are spoilers? If there is some asymmetry such that the "spoiler" label sticks only to underdogs and not to those who are favored in the polls, what principled account can be given of this asymmetry? The two major parties might want to perpetuate the assumption that a voter’s task is to choose between the two major party candidates. But this seems to me to be a false dichotomy.
When Ralph Nader announced he was entering the 2008 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton repeated the charge that he had "spoiled" the 2000 election for Al Gore and was responsible for Bush’s coming into office. When Bob Barr gained the nomination of the Libertarian Party last month, many pundits asked whether he might become a "spoiler" for John McCain. What is a spoiler supposed to be and by what reasoning are they identified?
In the case of Ralph Nader, the reasoning behind Clinton’s charge has the appearance of scapegoating. It is true that if all of those who voted for Nader had instead voted for Gore—and holding fixed all other votes as they were cast and recorded—Gore would have had more votes than Bush. However, looking at the vote totals for Florida in 2000, it is also true that if all of those who voted for Browne (or Buchanan or Phillips or Hagelin) had voted for Gore, then Gore would have had more votes than Bush. It might be that, on average, Nader voters were more likely to prefer Gore as a second option than were those who voted for the other minor party and independent candidates. However, the fact that any of these other groups of voters could also have swung the vote to Gore points to the real problem with spoiler arguments/accusations.
In most elections there are multiple candidates all competing with each other for as many votes as they can get. (But it is not just that there are a set number of voters who will vote and for whose votes the candidates are competing; the candidates are also all trying to "get out the vote.") And since the system is winner-take-all, every candidate covets the potential voters of every other candidate. In such a situation, every candidate wants to win (or so I am assuming here) and thus wants to spoil the election for every other candidate. Given this state of affairs, it would seem George W. Bush deserves Clinton’s ire as a "spoiler"—far more than Ralph Nader—since Bush took far more votes from Al Gore. Indeed, he took far more votes cast by registered Democrats!
Candidates
Votes
Vote %
Bush
2,909,176
49 %
Gore
2,907,451
49 %
Nader
96,837
2 %
Browne
18,856
0 %
Buchanan
17,356
0 %
Phillips
4,280
0 %
Hagelin
2,287
0 %
In this year’s election why shouldn’t Bob Barr or Ralph Nader claim that John McCain and Barack Obama are spoilers? If there is some asymmetry such that the "spoiler" label sticks only to underdogs and not to those who are favored in the polls, what principled account can be given of this asymmetry? The two major parties might want to perpetuate the assumption that a voter’s task is to choose between the two major party candidates. But this seems to me to be a false dichotomy.
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
ESCAPING BEING BOXED-IN BY ADOPTING NEW LINGUISTIC HABITS
11 June 08
Making commitments to aims rather than to policies is an untidy way of reducing the chances that candidates will box themselves in and thus introduce unwise limits to the alternatives considered in debate. The terms "aims" and "policies" do not neatly make the distinction at issue. Candidates can box themselves in by vociferously committing to an aim. On the other hand, commitment to a policy can turn out to be open-ended: Obama’s policy of talking to Iran without conditions has been readily and plausibly glossed to allow for preliminary agreement on an agenda; and that is a condition, though not a very limiting one. Unless we are to try the patience of the public by introducing an intricate apparatus of new terms and definitions, we shall have to rely on making a habit of something like the linguistic usage that favors a tendency to distinguish between aims and policies. When obstacles prevent us from carrying an aim to an end, we say that we remain committed to the aim, but postpone further efforts to achieve it, and meanwhile advance part way. When we have to abandon a policy, the embarrassment is greater, though we maybe able to minimize the embarrassment by retreating to treating it as an aim, to be achieved step by step.
Making commitments to aims rather than to policies is an untidy way of reducing the chances that candidates will box themselves in and thus introduce unwise limits to the alternatives considered in debate. The terms "aims" and "policies" do not neatly make the distinction at issue. Candidates can box themselves in by vociferously committing to an aim. On the other hand, commitment to a policy can turn out to be open-ended: Obama’s policy of talking to Iran without conditions has been readily and plausibly glossed to allow for preliminary agreement on an agenda; and that is a condition, though not a very limiting one. Unless we are to try the patience of the public by introducing an intricate apparatus of new terms and definitions, we shall have to rely on making a habit of something like the linguistic usage that favors a tendency to distinguish between aims and policies. When obstacles prevent us from carrying an aim to an end, we say that we remain committed to the aim, but postpone further efforts to achieve it, and meanwhile advance part way. When we have to abandon a policy, the embarrassment is greater, though we maybe able to minimize the embarrassment by retreating to treating it as an aim, to be achieved step by step.
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
COMMIT TO AIMS RATHER THAN POLICIES
10 June 08
Imagine one way in which the discussion during the prolonged primary competition might have gone better. The candidates need not have boxed themselves in on taxes, on talking to Iran, on talking to Hamas, on supporting Israel without qualification, as they all have done, except for Obama’s keeping a free hand about talking to Iran. They could have committed themselves to aims, not policies, and so kept some freedom to modify their policies according to circumstances. Thus, they could have said they would aim, by whatever means circumstances seemed to offer as productive, at establishing peaceful relations with Iran and dissuading Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons. Could any of the candidates have done this alone? Any one of them could have resisted examples of intransigence set by other candidates or foisted upon them by reckless commentators like Gibson and Stephanopoulos. The defense, of keeping some freedom of maneuver, is a powerful one, and implies directing the reproach of unfruitful rigidity against candidates who do not try to keep this freedom. Given a little luck and persistence, the defense, and commitment to aims not policies, might spread from candidate to candidate; and win the respect of the commentators. A big improvement in the style of debate could come from a small number of personal choices.
Imagine one way in which the discussion during the prolonged primary competition might have gone better. The candidates need not have boxed themselves in on taxes, on talking to Iran, on talking to Hamas, on supporting Israel without qualification, as they all have done, except for Obama’s keeping a free hand about talking to Iran. They could have committed themselves to aims, not policies, and so kept some freedom to modify their policies according to circumstances. Thus, they could have said they would aim, by whatever means circumstances seemed to offer as productive, at establishing peaceful relations with Iran and dissuading Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons. Could any of the candidates have done this alone? Any one of them could have resisted examples of intransigence set by other candidates or foisted upon them by reckless commentators like Gibson and Stephanopoulos. The defense, of keeping some freedom of maneuver, is a powerful one, and implies directing the reproach of unfruitful rigidity against candidates who do not try to keep this freedom. Given a little luck and persistence, the defense, and commitment to aims not policies, might spread from candidate to candidate; and win the respect of the commentators. A big improvement in the style of debate could come from a small number of personal choices.
Friday, June 6, 2008
A LEADING ROLE FOR HILLARY
6 June 08
Is it to be the Vice-Presidential nomination for Hillary Clinton, or just one supportive role among many other people’s, going from place to place to talk Obama’s candidacy up? There is a special role that she should find congenial and satisfying, offering as much or more historical honor as the Vice-Presidency. Let Obama choose her now to take the lead in Congress on universal health insurance. Let her in any case have her name on the bill; but let the bill put forward her own plan for health insurance, preferred by experts like Paul Krugman, and close enough to Obama’s for him to go along easily. She would not only have a distinctive role, dear to her heart, in Congress. She would have a distinctive role in the presidential campaign concentrating in her advocacy on one of the strongest points on the Democratic side; and making clear that only a Democratic victory would drive the point home.
Is it to be the Vice-Presidential nomination for Hillary Clinton, or just one supportive role among many other people’s, going from place to place to talk Obama’s candidacy up? There is a special role that she should find congenial and satisfying, offering as much or more historical honor as the Vice-Presidency. Let Obama choose her now to take the lead in Congress on universal health insurance. Let her in any case have her name on the bill; but let the bill put forward her own plan for health insurance, preferred by experts like Paul Krugman, and close enough to Obama’s for him to go along easily. She would not only have a distinctive role, dear to her heart, in Congress. She would have a distinctive role in the presidential campaign concentrating in her advocacy on one of the strongest points on the Democratic side; and making clear that only a Democratic victory would drive the point home.
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