AFGHANISTAN: ARGUMENT FOR STAYING; SUPERARGUMENT FOR GETTING OUT

After impressively long and careful reflection, President Obama has decided to stay in Afghanistan, with reinforcements. It is easy to understand how he could have found the argument for staying a compelling one. To leave would jeopardize whatever progress the United States has made in fostering the powers of the Afghan government to keep order, leave the Afghan popoulation (in particular Afghan women) subject to oppression; and no doubt encourage the Taliban and Al Quaeda to redouble their efforts to undermine United States policy elsewhere in the world. The trouble is that this argument, at this level of logic, is incomplete. It does not take into account, as a superargument on the next level of logic up would, the possibility that the argument for staying will be just as compelling at every reiteration in an unending succession of repetitions. That sort of reiteration kept the Vietnam War going; and trench warfare in World War I. Has the possibility of reiteration in respect to Afghanistan been evaluated as carefully as it needs to be? Is there present evidence that, even if some improvements are attained by present military policy, there will be grounds for a compelling reiterated argument next year and the year after, and so on indefinitely? If so, should we not get out now?